Juridisch kader 1:254 lid 1 en 1:261 lid 1 BW

HR 07 september 2007, nr.R07/005, NJ 2007,465, ro.7 en HR 27 juni 2008, nr,08/01779, NJ 2008/372, ro.3.3a en 5.1:

Vooropgesteld dient te worden dat een ondertoezichtstelling en en machtiging uithuisplaatsing slechts mogen worden verleend/verlengd indien de gronden daarvoor, zoals vermeld in de art. 1:254 lid 1 en 1:261 lid 1 BW (nog steeds) bestaan. De rechter zal (steeds) moeten onderzoeken of de minderjarige bij het uitblijven van de verzochte machtigingen zodanig verder zal opgroeien dat zijn zedelijke of geestelijke belangen of zijn gezondheid ernstig zullen worden bedreigd, en an- dere middelen ter afwending van deze bedreiging, naar is te voorzien, zullen falen. De rechter zal daarbij als uitgangspunt hebben te nemen dat in beginsel het uiteindelijke doel van de ondertoe- zichtstelling met gelijktijdige uithuisplaatsing is dat de minderjarige terugkeert bij de ouder(s), en dat de ouder(s) daartoe optimaal dien(t)(en) te worden voorbereid en dat er ook actief dient te wor- den gewerkt aan een situatie waarbinnen de kans van slagen zo groot mogelijk is.

Een EVRM-conforme afweging en beslissing ex artikel 8 en artikel 6 EVRM

Het negatieve recht van de ouders op respect voor het gezinsleven ligt besloten in artikel 8 EVRM. In artikel 8 EVRM ligt eveneens besloten de positieve verplichting van de overheid kinderen te be- schermen tegen aantasting van hun lichamelijke en geestelijke integriteit.

Een machtiging uithuisplaatsing is een inbreuk op het recht op gezinsleven tussen ouder en kind. Een dergelijke inbreuk is alleen gerechtvaardigd indien deze inbreuk voorzien is bij wet, een legi- tiem doel nastreeft en bovendien noodzakelijk is in een democratische samenleving, ingevolge het tweede lid van artikel 8 EVRM.

Op de vraag of de maatregel van uithuisplaatsing noodzakelijk is in een democratische samenle- ving legt het Europese hof het volgende (vaste rechtspraak) toetsingskader aan:

“48… the Court will consider whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify it were relevant and sufficient for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention and whether the requisite decision-making process was fair and such as to afford due respect tot the interests safeguarded bij Article 8.” (EHRM 18/12/2008, no.39948/06, NJCM-bull. juli/augustus 2009, p.523-535 m.nt. BW (zie bijvoorbeeld ook Kutzner v. Germany, no.46544/99, paragraaf 65, ECHR 2002-I).

Het Europese hof meent dat om de verdragsrechtelijke bescherming vorm te geven de (kin- der)rechter het gehele besluitvormingsproces moet betrekken in haar beoordeling. Daarbij moet het besluitvormingsproces eerlijk plaats hebben gevonden.

“49… notwithstanding a margin of appreciation enjoyed bij the domestic authorities in deciding on placing a child into public care, severing family ties means cutting a child off from its roots, which can only be justified in very exceptional circumstances.”

Hoewel de overheid enige beoordelingsruimte heeft bij uithuisplaatsing behoort uithuisplaatsing tot één van de meest ingrijpende inbreuken op het gezinsleven. Alleen in heel bijzondere omstandig- heden kan een dergelijke beslissing worden gerechtvaardigd.

“..A relevant decision must therefore be supported bij sufficiently sound and weighty considerations in the interests of the child , and it is for the respondent State to establish that a carefull assesment of the impact of the proposed care measure on the parents and the child has been made.”
Niet alleen moet de beslissing van bureau jeugdzorg gebaseerd zijn op een goede argumentatie, maar deze moet uitgebreid worden gemotiveerd. Daarbij dient Bureau Jeugdzorg te onderzoeken wat de impact is van de maatregel op ouders en kind.

“50…In particular, where the decision is explained in terms of a need to protect a child from danger, the existence of such a danger should actually established.”

Het Hof overweegt dat er daadwerkelijk een gevaar moet zijn voor de ontwikkelingsbelangen van het kind (er kan dus niet worden gespeculeerd!).

“In taking a decision on removal of a child, a variety of factors may be pertinent, such as whether bij virtue of remaining in the care of its parents the child would suffer abuse or neglect, educational deficiencies and lack of emotional support, or whether the child’s placement in public care is ne- cessitated bij the state of its physical or mental health. On the other hand, the mere fact that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his or her upbringing does not on its own jus- tify a compulsory measure of removal. Neither can this measure be justified by a mere reference to the parents’ precarious situation, which can be adressed by less radical means than the splitting of the family, such as targeted financial assistance and social counselling.”

Verschillende aspecten spelen een rol bij het besluitvormingsproces. Het enkele feit dat een kind het ergens anders beter heeft is niet voldoende noch de sociale of financiële situatie rechtvaardi- gen een uithuisplaatsing nu de staat minder ingrijpende mogelijkheden heeft deze problemen aan- vaardbaar te maken (sociale dienst, maatschappelijke positie, enz).

“51… in asessing the quality of a decision-making process leading to splitting up the family, the Court will see, in particular, whether the conclusions of the domestic authorities were based on suf- ficient evidentiary basis (including, as appropriate, statements by witnesses, reports by competent authorities, psychological and other expert asessments and medical notes) and whether the inte- rested parties, in particular the parents, had sufficient opportunity to participate in the procedure in question. The court will also have to regard to whether, where appropriate, the children themselves were able to express their views.”

Bewijslast bij overheid

Het Europese Hof geeft nadrukkelijk aan dat de beslissingen moeten worden onderbouwd en ge- baseerd op een voldoende bewijsrechtelijke basis. De enkele stelling van de gezinsvoogdijinstel- ling als partij in een procedure lijkt onvoldoende. De bewijslast wordt bij de overheid gelegd omdat deze immers inbreuk pleegt op het recht op gezinsleven. Bovendien moeten de ouders en zo mo- gelijk het kind in het besluitvormingsproces een actieve en belangrijke rol krijgen.

“52…taking a child into care should normally be regarded as a temporary measure, to be disconti- nued as soon as circumstances permit. It cannot, therefore, be justified without prior consideration of the possible alternatives and should be viewed in the context of the State’s positive obligation to make serious and sustained efforts to facilitate the reuniting of children with their natural parents and until then enable regular contact between them, including, where possible, by keeping the siblings together.”

Het Europese Hof is voorts van mening dat uithuisplaatsing een in beginsel tijdelijke maatregel is die met zich brengt dat de overheid de verplichting op zich heeft genomen ouders en kind te hel- pen weer samen een gezin te vormen. Bureau Jeugdzorg heeft bovendien een verplichting het contact zo uitgebreid als mogelijk tot stand te brengen bij een uithuisplaatsing en de kinderen zo- veel als mogelijk tezamen onder te brengen.

a. General principles

133. The Court’s case-law regarding care proceedings and measures taken in respect of children clearly establishes that, in assessing whether an interference was “necessary in a democratic society”, two aspects of the proceedings require consideration. First, the Court must examine whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify the measures were “relevant and sufficient”; second it must be examined whether the decision-making process was fair and afforded due respect to the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention (see K and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, § 154, ECHR 2001- VII; R.K. and A.K. v. the United Kingdom, no. 38000/05, § 34, 30 September 2008; T.S. and D.S. v. the United Kingdom(dec.), no.61540/09, 19 January 2010;A.D. and O.D. v. the United Kingdom, no. 28680/06, § 82, 16 March 2010;Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, § 134, 6 July 2010; and R. and H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 35348/06, §§ 75 and 81, 31 May 2011).

134. The Court reiterates that in cases concerning the placing of a child for adoption, which entails the permanent severance of family ties, the best interests of the child are paramount (see Johansen v. Norway, 7 August 1996, § 78, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III; Kearns v. France, no. 35991/04, § 79, 10 January 2008; and R. and H., cited above, §§ 73 and 81). In identifying the child’s best interests in a particular case, two considerations must be borne in mind: first, it is in the child’s best interests that his ties with his family be maintained except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit; and second, it is in the child’s best interests to ensure his development in a safe and secure environment (see Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 136; and R. and H., cited above, §§73-74). It is clear from the foregoing that family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, where appropriate, to “rebuild” the family (see Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 136; and R. and H., cited above, § 73). It is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his upbringing (see K and T., cited above, § 173; and T.S. and D.S., cited above). However, where the maintenance of family ties would harm the child’s health and development, a parent is not entitled under Article 8 to insist that such ties be maintained (see Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 136; and R. and H., cited above, § 73).

135. The identification of the child’s best interests and the assessment of the overall proportionality of any given measure will require courts to weigh a number of factors in the balance. The Court has not previously set out an exhaustive list of such factors, which may vary depending on the circumstances of the case in question. However, it observes that the considerations listed in section 1 of the 2002 Act (see paragraph 103above) broadly reflect the various elements inherent in assessing the necessity under Article 8 of a measure placing a child for adoption. In particular, it considers that in seeking to identify the best interests of a child and in assessing the necessity of any proposed measure in the context of placement proceedings, the domestic court must demonstrate that it has had regard to, inter alia, the age, maturity and ascertained wishes of the child, the likely effect on the child of ceasing to be a member of his original family and the relationship the child has with relatives.

136. The Court recognises that, in reaching decisions in so sensitive an area, local authorities and courts are faced with a task that is extremely difficult. Further, the national authorities have had the benefit of direct contact with all the persons concerned, often at the very stage when care measures are being envisaged or immediately after their implementation. There is therefore a need to allow them a certain margin of appreciation in deciding how best to deal with the cases before them and it is accordingly not the Court’s task to substitute itself for the domestic authorities but to review, in the light of the Convention, the decisions taken and assessments made by those authorities in the exercise of their margin of appreciation (see K and T., cited above, § 154; A.D. and O.D., cited above, § 83; Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 138; and R. and H., cited above, § 81). However, it must be borne in mind that the decisions taken by the courts in this field are often irreversible, particularly in a case such as the present one where a placement order has been made. This is accordingly a domain in which there is an even greater call than usual for protection against arbitrary interferences (see B. v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1987, § 63, Series A no. 121; X v. Croatia, no.11223/04, § 47, 17 July 2008; and R. and H., cited above, § 76).

137. The margin of appreciation to be accorded to the competent national authorities will vary in the light of the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the interests at stake, such as, on the one hand, the importance of protecting a child in a situation which is assessed as seriously threatening to his or her health or development and, on the other hand, the aim of reuniting the family as soon as circumstances permit (see K and T., cited above, § 155). The Court has indicated that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity of taking a child into care. However, a stricter scrutiny is called for in respect of any further limitations, such as restrictions placed by the authorities on parental rights of access, and of any legal safeguards designed to secure an effective protection of the right of parents and children to respect for their family life, as such further limitations entail the danger that the family relations between the parents and a young child are effectively curtailed (see K and T., cited above, § 155; R.K. and A.K., cited above, § 34; and A.D. and O.D., cited above, § 83; R. and H., cited above, § 81). The making of a placement order in respect of a child must be subject to the closest scrutiny.

138. As to the decision-making process, what has to be determined is whether, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and notably the serious nature of the decisions to be taken, the parents have been involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their interests and have been able fully to present their case (see Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 139; and R. and H., cited above, § 75). Thus it is incumbent upon the Court to ascertain whether the domestic courts conducted an in-depth examination of the entire family situation and of a whole series of factors, in particular of a factual, emotional, psychological, material and medical nature, and made a balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective interests of each person, with a constant concern for determining what would be the best solution for the child (see,mutatis mutandis, Neulinger and Shuruk, cited above, § 139). In practice, there is likely to be a degree of overlap in this respect with the need for relevant and sufficient reasons to justify a measure in respect of the care of a child.

139. The need to involve the parents fully in the decision-making process is all the greater where the proceedings may culminate in a child being taken from his biological parents and placed for adoption (R. and H., cited above, § 76).